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Notes
Cloture, Continuing Rules
and the Constitution
Filibusters, session after session, have highlighted the
United States Senate's rules for limiting debate. Under
the now-famous cloture rule, debate on a motion, even
on a motion to revise the cloture rule itself, can be limited only upon consensus (two-thirds) of the senators
far-reaching
present and voting. By another-more
though less-famous -Senate rule, the rules of the Senate continue automatically from Congress to Congress.
The author of this Note compares the wisdom of consensus with majority rule as a procedure for limiting
debate and then considers whether the Constitution
compels either. He concludes that cloture by consensus
or majority rule is simply a matter of Senate choice;
that since the Constitution requiresneither, the Senate
is free to make that choice; but that one Senate cannot
bind succeeding Senates to its choice - a continuing
Senate rule which limits the revision of the rules is void.
Monticello, January 17, 1810

Dear Sir:
I observe that the House of Representatives are sensible of the ill

effects of the long speeches in their House on their proceedings. But

they -have a worse effect in the disgust they excite among the people,
and the disposition they are producing to transfer their confidence
from the Legislature to the executive branch, which would sap our
Constitution....
Ever affectionately yours.
Thomas Jeffersoni

I. INTRODUCTION
In the past half-century, perhaps no subject has been more a
source of frustration to the United States Senate than the controversy over its own rules. The years since 1917, the date cloture
was adopted by the Senate, have seen at least five major encounters within that body,2 consuming hundreds of hours, thousands
1. Letter From Thomas Jefferson to John Eppes, Jan. 17, 1810, in 95 Co.G.
Rxc. 2265 (1949). Recent criticisms to the same effect are gathered in 105 CoNG.
Rsc. 129-32 (1959); 103 CoNG. REc. 17-24 (1957).
2. See 105 CoNG. Rnc. 8-494 (1959); 103 CONG. REC. 9-214 (1957); 99
CoNG. REC. 108-232 (1953); 95 CONG. REC. 1583--02724 (1949); 55 CoNG. Rxc.
8-45 (1917).
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of pages of print, and eliciting a wide range of philosophic and
pragmatic arguments, noteworthy as much for their passion as
for their profundity. In each conflict the specific concern was the
problem of unlimited debate; but underlying the immediate issue
was a basic disagreement as to the permissible method by which
the Senate may adopt a new rule limiting debate.'
Senate debate is not totally unlimitable. Senate Rule XXII the now-famous cloture rule - provides
(2) . .. [Ait any time a motion signed by sixteen Senators, to bring
to a close the debate upon any measure, motion, or other matter pending before the Senate ....
is presented to the Senate, the Presiding
Officer shall at once state the motion to the Senate, and one hour after
the Senate meets on the following calendar day 'but one, he shall lay
the motion before the Senate and . . . submit to -the Senate by a
yea-and-nay vote the question:
"Is it the sense of the Senate that the debate shall be brought
to a close?"
And if that question be decided in the affirmative by two-thirds of
the Senators present and voting, then said measure, motion, or other
matter . . . shall be the unfinished business to the exclusion of all
other business until disposed of.
Thereafter no Senator shall be entitled to speak in all more than
one hour on the measure, motion, or other matter pending before the
Senate . .. .4
3. See Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Shuman,

Senate Rules and the Civil Rights Bill: A Case Study, 51 Am. POL. SCI. REV.
955, 957-61 (1957).
4. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Manual, S.
Doc. No. 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. Rule XXII (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1963
Senate Manual]. Cloture, and its predecessor, the motion for the previous
question, see 1 HAYNEs, TxE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 892-96 (1938);
MASON, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 241-46 (1953), has had a long
and turbulent history. The motion for the previous question apparently originated in the British House of Commons in 1604. See 105 CoNG. REC. 307
(1959). During the 17th century it was successfully employed 491 times by
that body in order to shut off debate and bring the pending matter to a vote.
Ibid. The previous question was adopted by both houses of Congress in 1789.
See BunDETTE, FmmuSTERING IN THE SENATE 219-20 (1940); GALLOWAY,
LIMITATION OF DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 6

(1951); 1 HAYNES,

op. cit. supra at 392. Through its use, debate could be closed by majority vote.
While the motion was itself debatable, the presiding officer had unappealable
power to demand relevance in debate. See 105 CoNG. REc. 307-08 (1059). The
motion was omitted from the Senate rules in 1806, but until 1828 the presiding officer retained the absolute power to rule speakers out of order for using
speech as a dilatory tactic. Ibid. In 1828 the Senate made such a ruling by
the chair appealable to the Senate body. 4 CONG. DEB. 278-341 (1828). In
1872 the Vice-President ruled that the presiding officer had no power to require a Senator to surrender the floor because of irrelevancy in debate. CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1293-94 (1872); HAYNES, op. cit. supra at 423-24.
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Thus, the Senate abandoned its last effective control over debate.
In the 45 years that followed,
filibustering ...

assumed astounding proportions ....

In the last

two decades of the nineteenth century storms of obstruction . . . swept
Parliamentary tactics to overcome obstruction
the chamber ....
proved to be hopeless and ineffectual . ... The power of the Senate

lay not in votes but in sturdy tongues and iron wills. The premium
rested not upon ability and statesmanship but on effrontery and
audacity.
BuRDaa, op. cit. upra at 79-80.
Finally, on March 8, 1917, following the filibuster of the Armed Ship Bill,
see 54 CONG. REc. 427,-73, 4719-5020 (1917); BuRDnarr, op. cit. supra at
115-23, the Senate adopted a cloture rule which provided a method for shutting off debate by two-thirds vote of the present and voting members. 55
CONG. REC. 19-45 (1917). In -the succeeding 32 years, cloture under this rule
was successful in 4 of 21 attempts. See GA&LowAy, op. cit. supra at 26 (1951).
The utility of the rule was diminished when, on August 2, 1948, Senator Vandenberg, acting in the capacity of President pro tempore of the Senate, ruled
that the cloture provision was inapplicable to a motion to consider a measure,
94 CONG. fREc. 9602-04 (1948) (Senator Vandenberg, however, did favor
amending the cloture rule so as to make it applicable to motions to take up
a measure, 95 CONG. Ec. 2227 (1949)), which is a debatable motion under
general parliamentary rules, see MASON, op. cit. supra at 79-&1. Thus, a filibuster could still be successfully waged, without fear of cloture, where the
sponsor of a bill attempted .to bring that bill to the Senate floor and make it
the present business of the Senate.
Disturbed by this limitation and by the general ineffectiveness of the rule,
the opponents of unlimited debate attempted to amend the cloture rule in
1949. See 95 CONG. Enc. 1606--274 (1949). The result was a compromise
which made the cloture rule applicable to motions to take up a measure, but
which expressly made cloture unavailable to limit debate on motions to revise
the rules. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Manual, S.
Doc. No. 5, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 26-207 Rule XXII (1951) [hereinafter cited
as 1951 Senate Manual]. This amendment made it practically impossible to
defeat a filibuster designed to prevent a change in the cloture rule itself. The
1949 revision further provided that two-thirds of the members duly chosen
and sworn-a "constitutional two-thirds" -would be required to invoke
cloture. Ibid. As thus amended, the rule was even less effective as a device
for limiting debate -than its predecessor, if the "constitutional two-thirds"
requirement -had -been in effect before 1949, only three of the 22 cloture attempts would 'have been successful. Under the 1917 rule (two-thirds present
and voting), cloture succeeded four times: Treaty of Versailles, 78 to 16 vote
(1919); World Court, 68 to 26 vote (1926); Branch Banking, 65 to 18 vote
(1917); Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Prohibition, 55 to 27 vote (1927).
Under a "constitutional two-thirds" requirement, 64 affirmative votes would
have been necessary.
In 1959, the final significant change in the cloture rule was adopted. 105
CONG. REc. 10-11 (1959). The effect of this revision was (1) to allow cloture
upon two-thirds vote of the members present and voting; (2) to permit the
cloture motion to be utilized to limit debate on motions to revise the rules;
(3) to provide that the rules of the Senate shall continue from one Senate to
the next Senate unless changed in accordance with the present rules. 1963
Senate Manual Rule XXXLE(2). At present, therefore, the cloture rule closely
resembles the 1917 version, with two exceptions: It is applicable to motions
to take up a measure, and the rules recognize that changes in the rules can
be accomplished only within the procedure dictated 'by the existing rules.
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Cloture under this rule has proven difficult, and the advocates
of unlimited debate have fought off numerous attempts to change
the rule to make it available upon majority, or even three-fifths,
vote.' The extent to which the present Rule XXII assures unlimited debate depends, however, upon the validity of one proposition: that the rules of the Senate are binding upon each succeeding body at and from the moment of its inception.' If they
are not, the present Rule XXXII, which provides that "the rules
of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules,"' is
useless verbiage, for any future Senate interested in changing the
rules could simply disregard that requirement," shut off debate by
majority vote, and adopt a new cloture provision also by majority
vote.
The proposition that the rules are automatically binding that they are "continuing rules" - has been frequently challenged
in the past half-century on the ground that each Senate has the
constitutional right to make its rules anew. The critics of unlimited debate have also maintained that the provision requiring
two-thirds vote in order to obtain cloture violates a constitutional
requirement of majority rule in the Senate. 10 The objectives of
this Note are to determine first whether the Constitution requires
the Senate to function either by consensus or by majority vote;
then, assuming that legislation by majority vote or by consensus
is a matter of legislative choice, whether succeeding Senates are
bound by the choice of their predecessors.
5. See, e.g., 105 CONG. REC. 8-494 (1959); 99 CONG. REC. 108-232 (1953).
6. See, e.g., 103 CONG. REc. 31-43 (1957) (brief placed in the Record by
Senator Knowland); 99 CONG. REC. 108 (1953) (remarks of Senator Taft).

7. 1963 Senate Manual Rule XXXII(2).
8. See 105 CONG. REC. 490 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse).
9. "[E]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings .... " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5. While the term "each House" has never been judicially
defined, it seems clear that it refers not only to both houses of Congress, but
also to each succeeding Congress. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1
(1892); 108 CONG. REC. 25 (1957) (brief prepared by Senator Douglas). It is
this clause which critics contend is violated by the "continuing rules" theory.
See 103 CONG. REc. 13 (1957) (brief prepared by Senator Douglas); 99 CONG.
REC. 220 (1953) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); 99 CONG. REc. 185 (1953)
(brief placed in the Record by Senator Lehman); 55 CONG. REc. 9-11 (1917)
(remarks of Senator Walsh).
10. This argument appears to have been first advanced by Walter Reuther
in Hearings 148-50.
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A.

CONSENSUS V. MAJORITY RULE

A WiRm C(ToIcE?

Critics ascribe various legislative evils to the practice of unlimited debate. First, an obvious effect of the filibuster," the
creature of unlimited debate, is to prevent the enactment of important legislation that has been the object of the filibuster. Civil
rights bills axe only the most recent example of legislation so
defeated; treaties, public welfare and conservation legislation, and
wax emergency legislation are among the other victims of the
filibuster. ' Equally undesirable, it has been asserted, is the tendency of the very threat of a filibuster to prevent even the introduction of controversial resolutions into the Senate mill, or to
cause those bills to be substantially "watered down" before introduction. 3 Somewhat less obvious, but equally significant, is the
fact that time consumed in filibusters may prevent the consideration and enactment of other important, if less controversial legislation; it has been estimated that the time lost in a dozen of the
more famous filibusters of the 19th and 20th centuries was 304
days.j ' Finally, in addition to the frustration, delay, and waste
occasioned by the filibuster, its critics assert that use of the device results in a tarnishing of the senatorial "image": "A body
which cannot govern itself will not long hold the respect of the
people who have chosen it to govern the country,"' 5 for, to the
electorate, "to vote without debating is perilous, but to debate
and never vote is imbecile"' 6
11.
[A] name originally given to the buccaneers. The term ... was revived
in America to designate those adventurers who, after the termination
of the war between Mexico and the United States, organized expeditions within the United States to take part in West Indian and Central

American revolutions .... In the United States it is colloquially applied -tolegislators who practice obstruction.
BRrrrmTA
235 (1949). For an authoritative history of the
filibuster, see BURmET=, op. cit. supra note 4. See also 1 HAmts, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 392-4127; oUms, THE AUm cm SmxATE 161-91 (1926); Myers,
Limitation of Debate in the United States Senate, 23 TEmi. L.Q. 1 (1949).
12. See GLwowAy, op. cit. supra note 4, at 20-25; 95 CoNG. REc. 130-31
(1949) (remarks of Senator Morse).
13. Hearings 150 (brief submitted by Walter IReuther); see 105 CoNG. RMlc.
326 (1959) (remarks of Senator Case); id. at 330 (remarks of Senator Douglas);
id. at 05 (remarks of Senator Javits).
14. GALxowAy, op. cit. supra note 4, at 20--n3; see 95 CONG. lrc. 2131-37
(1949) (remarks of Senator Pepper).
15. 95 CoNG. REc. 2265 (1949) (remarks of Senator O':Mahoney).
16. Lodge, Obstructionin the Senate, 157 Normr Am. RIv. 523, 527 (1893).
9 ENcYcLOPEon&
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The proponents of unlimited debate forcefully assert that the
present cloture rule is a desirable method of guaranteeing some
degree of senatorial unanimity on important legislation; it assures that a relatively small body of men, representing a significant social, economic, or political interest or area, can prevent
enactment of legislation that is fundamentally offensive to that
interest or area.' 7 This approach to the legislative process "government by consensus" -may be justifiable on the ground
that it will prevent that "tyranny of the majority" which some
have considered
to be potentially the fatal defect of the American
8
republic.'
But while consensus is obviously desirable, that that consideration should always be decisive is by no means clear. Experience,
for example, might indicate that during periods of national crisis,
the principle of majority rule is warranted. Distinctions between the kinds of legislation for which majority rule and consensus rule are desirable might even be possible. The very availability of each alternative might, in fact, have a desirable effect
in limiting abuses that might otherwise result from unqualified
acceptance of either alternative. A minority, for example, would
be well-advised to use the right of unlimited debate only to oppose
those resolutions that it considered fundamentally offensive to
its interests, rather than as a device to prevent enactment of any
legislation it disliked; injudicious use of the right might result in
the majority's restricting freedom of debate. That the availability
of both rules would prevent abuse of a rule providing a procedure
for limiting debate by majority vote is more difficult to argue,
however, for the minority would theoretically be unable to adopt
a consensus rule even if the majority did abuse the procedure for
limiting debate. Yet this objection assumes that elected representatives are mere opportunists; moreover, it fails to acknowledge sufficiently the adverse public reaction that would presumably accompany any extensive and protracted abuse of a rule for
limiting debate by majority vote, and the restraining effect that
fear of the adverse reaction would have.
The other benefits of unlimited debate are similarly open to
question. The importance of maintaining the Senate as a "great
deliberative body" is probably exaggerated, partly because there
has been a significant shift in policy making from the legislative
17. See Wnsox, CONSTITUTIoNAL GOVERNMENT IN TE UNITD STATES 121
(1908); Hearings 253 (quoting former Vice President Stevenson); Lippman, A
Critique of Congress, Newsweek, Jan. 20, 1964, p. 20.
18. See, e.g., 1 DETocQuEViLLE, DmVo=cRAcy IN AMERICA 235-51 (Reeve
transl. 1838); 105 CoNG. REC. 149-53 (1959) (remarks of Senator Talmadge).
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to the executive branch, and partly because Senate debate probably has no substantial effect on the members of that body - the
arguments for and against important legislation are typically
well-known before the proposal reaches the Senate floor. Likewise,
with the mass communication network of the present day, unlimited debate is probably not necessary either to call public
attention to important issues or to educate the electorate.
Therefore, while the objective of this Note is not to demonstrate that the practice of unlimited debate is without justification, it is suggested that different Senates may, if given the opportunity, rationally reach different conclusions as to whether a
consensus rule or a majority rule is preferable. The threshold
question, however, in determining whether the Senate has
that opportunity, is whether the Constitution requires either
alternative.

B.

WHAT Tim CONSTTUTION REQUImS

There is substantial evidence, both in circumstances surrounding the constitutional convention and in the Constitution itself,
that majority rule was the preference of the nation's founders. The
delegates to the convention recognized that the requirement of
two-thirds vote for important legislation was a significant weakness of the Articles of Confederation; 19 they selected the principle
of majority rule to govern the convention itself 9 Of more significance is the fact that the convention twice rejected proposals that
two-thirds vote be required for enactment of specific types of
congressional legislation." The Constitution as finally drafted is
further indication of the preference for majority rule, for it provides that a majority, rather than two-thirds of the members, as
was proposed in the convention, - should constitute a quorum for
doing business.?s
Most frequently advanced as evidence that majority rule is
demanded by the Constitution is the enumeration in that document of five areas in which more than majority vote is required
19. Arts. of Confed. arts. IX, X (1777); see 1 ELLIOT, DEBATES 127-39
(1836); PREscoTT, DRA nTG Tim FEDERAL CoNsTr Tnor
FEDERALIST No.22 (Hamilton).

4-5 (1941); Tnc

20. See FAnRAND, FRA3mNG TEm CONSTITUTION op TiE ImTm STATES 5

(1913).
21. On August 29, 1787, the convention rejected a motion to subject legislation concerning interstate and foreign commerce to two-thirds vote. A twothirds requirement for legislation relating to navigation was defeated on September 15, 1787. 5 ELioT, DEBATES 489-92, 552 (1886).
22. See PREscoTT, op. cit. supra note 19, at 424-27.
23. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
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to obtain senatorial action: impeachments; 4 expulsion of congressmen; 25 overriding of presidential veto; 20 ratification of treaties; 2 7 and initiation by Congress of proposals to amend the Constitution.28 Advocates of the majority-rule theory contend that

"when a document, as carefully drafted and considered as was
the Constitution, enumerates particular exceptions to a general
rule, it must be concluded that no other exceptions were intended
to be made."' Such a construction, they argue, is consistent with
the judicial doctrine that "exemptions made in such detail preclude
their enlargement by implication." 80 This argument, however, is
not dispositive of whether majority rule is constitutionally required, for the Constitution does not spell out a "general rule" to
which the five enumerated areas are "exceptions." Even avoiding
that objection, the further question remains whether the exemptions have been made in "such detail" to "preclude their enlargement by implication"; such a question should be resolved analytically on an ad hoc basis by evaluating the nature of the exceptions and by comparing them with the scope of the legislative
scheme to which they are exceptions.
Majority rule does not need to be proven constitutionally
demanded, however, to reject the senatorial consensus theory as a
constitutional requirement, for it is at least clear that the framers
of the Constitution rejected the latter proposition. 1 Thus,
assuming that the Constitution does not require majority rule,
the choice between the two alternatives is not one to be made by
recourse to the Constitution; rather, it becomes, under traditional
constitutional theory, a matter of legislative choice. The Senate,
therefore, has the power to determine whether it will function
under rules that insure consensus or under the principle of majority vote. Once that power has been exercised, an inquiry must
be directed to the extent to which such action is binding on successive bodies, and the methods by which those bodies may
change the rule previously selected.
2A. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
25. U.S. CoNsT.
26. U.S. CONST.
27. U.S. CONSIT.
28. U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 5.
art. I, § 7.
art. HT, § 2.
art. V.

29. Hearings 149 (brief submitted by Walter Reuther).
30. Cf. Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944). See also Continental Cas. Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942).
31. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
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II. EFFECT OF A LEGISLATIVE CHOICE
A.

THE "CONTINUING BODY" THEORY

Those who have sought to prevent change in the cloture rule
argue that because the Senate is a continuing body, the Senate
rules continue automatically from session to session; changes in

the rules can therefore be accomplished only within the procedure

prescribed by the existing rules.3 2 This rationale was seemingly
recognized by the Senate in 1959 when it adopted Rule XXXII,
providing for the continuance of rules.! Although such automatic continuance does prevent a parliamentary vacuum at the
commencement of each new Senate, 4 the reasons advanced to
sustain the procedure are not convincing. The major premise of
the argument, the theory that the Senate is a continuing body,35

is defended on several grounds: First, it is argued that the Constitution demands this conclusion because, by providing that

"two-thirds of the membership of the Senate be in office at all
times, and . . .that a majority of the Senate shall constitute a
quorum to do business, it is apparent that the Senate was in-

tended to be and is a continuing body." ' This argument is unpersuasive, however, for the intent of the constitutional framers,
in providing for two-thirds carryover of Senate membership, was
to guarantee some degree of continuity in governmental policy
32. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
33. See note 4 mpra.
34. It has been argued that if the rules did not carry over, two difficulties would confront each new Senate: (1) there would be no rules to govern
the proceedings of the Senate in adopting new rules; (2) controversies as to
which rules should be adopted, for example cloture by majority or two-thirds
vote, would prevent adoption of any rules and the Senate would become a
'parliamentary jungle." Yet the House of Representatives adopts its rules
anew at the commencement of each new session- a resolution is offered for
the adoption of new rules, often phrased in terms of the rules of the preceding
Congress. E.g., 99 CoNG.llnc. 15-2-4 1953); see GALlOWAY, LroIATrvE PnoCEVuRE ix CoxGEESS 15 (1955). During the period preceding adoption, the

House operates under general rules of parliamentary procedure, under which
debate can always ie closed by a call for the previous question. E.g., 99 CONG.
REc. 24 (1953). Even where there is controversy as to the rules, debate does
not appear to reduce the House to a "jungle." See, e.g., 97 Co.NG. REc. 9
(1951); 95 CONG. REC. 10 (1949).
35. See 103 ACONG. REc. 212-13 (1957) (brief placed in the Recorcd by
Senator Daniel); 52 CONG. lc. S793 (1915) (remarks of Senator Root); CoNo.
GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 240 (1841) (remarks of Senator Buchanan);
BmAwD, A-Amarc

GovEaNmwr Aim Porucs 109 (1931); Cusnwa,

PRAcnCz or LGIsAIvE AsEBTS

104 (1907); 1 HAmSn,

LAW AN.-D

op. ct. supra

note 4, at 341.
36. 103 CoNG. REc. 212 (1957) (brief placed in the Record by Senator
Daniel).
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and responsibility;37 in none of the debates during or after the
constitutional convention was there any suggestion that a purpose of the carryover provision was to insure continuance of parliamentary rules. Nor does continuance of the rules appear
essential in order to accomplish the continuity in policy and
responsibility that the carryover clause was designed to encourage. Similarly, the purpose of the majority quorum provision has
been misinterpreted. Its objective was to remedy one of the more
troublesome defects of the Articles of Confederation - the requirement of two-thirds approval of important legislation.8 8 Thus,
the quorum clause does not support the continuing body theory,
and in fact, it reflects a preference for majority rule; it is therefore
a strange bedfellow to those who defend the two-thirds cloture
rule on the ground that that rule is consistent with a constitutional preference for consensus action on legislation.
Supreme Court - as well as some state court3 - decisions
have also been advanced as support for the continuing body
theory. In McGrain v. Daugherty,40 a leading example, the Supreme Court considered the legality of a warrant issued by the
Senate for attachment of a person who ignored a subpoena from
a Senate committee. In holding the warrant valid, the Court considered the question whether the case had become moot because
the warrant was issued by a committee of the previous Congress.
The Court concluded that "the committee may be continued or
revived [by the succeeding Senate] now by motion to that effect
This being so, and the Senate being a continuing body,
the case cannot be said to have become moot in the ordinary
37. See ScmmLz, CREATION OF THE SENATE 4-18 (1937); THE FEDERALIST
Nos. 62, 63 (Hamilton).
38. See authorities cited note 19 supra.
39. Two state decisions have referred to the United States Senate as a
continuing body. Robertson v. Smith, 109 Ind. 79, 123, 10 N.E. 582, 603
(1887); State ex rel. Werts v. Rogers, 56 N.J.L. 480, 622, 28 At]. 726, 700
(1894). Such statements are obviously not controlling, nor under the circumstances of those cases can they be given great weight as the considered conclusions of state courts. In Robertson the court did not assess the merits of
the continuing body argument; rather, it assumed the validity of the theory
and decided that it was inapplicable to that state's legislature because, unlike
the Senate, a sufficient number of that state's lawmakers did not carry over
to the succeeding legislature. Nor did the court in Rogers assess the merits
of the theory; it merely concluded that even though, like the United States
Senate, two-thirds of New Jersey's lawmakers carried over, there was nothing
to indicate that the framers of the New Jersey Constitution intended the
legislature to be a "continuing body."
For a description of parliamentary methods in state legislatures, see generally DODDS, PROCEDURE IN STATE LEGISLATURES (1918).
40. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
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sense"' While the Court did state that the Senate is a continuing body, that factor was clearly not essential to the result. The
decision was premised on the possibility of revival, which led the
Court to conclude only that the case was not moot; the Court
did not decide that a committee may continue automatically
beyond the life of the expired Senate. Even assuming the Court
did so decide, that holding would not, of course, be dispositive of
whether the Senate is a continuing body for all purposes. Moreover, if the Court in McGrainhad held otherwise, the investigatory power of Congress would have been impaired, for any person
could then ignore with impunity any subpoena issued near the
expiration of a congressional session. No similarly compelling reason demands the acceptance of the continuing body theory with
reference to the Senate rules. 43
Finally, it is contended that long-continued acquiescence by
the Senate "definitely points to the acceptance of the theory that
the Senate is a continuing body.'" Since its organization, the
custom of the Senate has been to begin operation of each Congress
without readopting its rules. The practice was never questioned
until 1917 when, at the opening of the 65th Congress, Senator
Walsh of Montana offered a resolution squarely raising the issue
whether the rules are continuous. 5 The question was not voted
41. Id. at 182.
42. Sinclair v. United States, 279 US. 263 (1928), has been considered
a direct holding by the Court that the Senate is a continuing body. 105 Co.
REc. 109, 111 (1959) .(remarks of Senator Robertson). Sinclair involved the
validity of the conviction of petitioner for refusal to answer questions before
a Senate committee. The committee investigation had been authorized by
two resolutions of the Senate of the 67th Congress. S. Res. 282, 67th Cong.,
2d Sess., 62 CONG. IRac. 6097 (1922); S.Res. 294, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 62
CONG. RBc. 8140 (1922). A third resolution, S. Res. 4S4, 67th Cong., 4th Sess.,
64 CoNG. Ilc. 8048 (19-3), adopted before the end of the 67th Congress,
stated that the investigation authorized by the two previous resolutions
should be continued until the end of the 68th Congress. Petitioner argued
that the last resolution was of no force and effect because the committee
expired with -the Congress. 279 US. at 273. Senator Robertson, however,
apparently misread the decision, for although the issue of whether the Senate
is a continuing body was raised by the facts and argued before the Court,
it was never discussed in the opinion. The portion of the decision quoted by
the Senator as support for "a direct -holding" concerns the validity of a resolution -incorrectlyidentifying a previous resolution.
43. This rationale is equally applicable to the Sinclair case. See note 42

.,upra.
44. 108 CoNG. REc. 212 (1957) (brief -placed in the Record by Senator
Daniel).
45.

Resolved: That until further ordered the rules in force at the close
of the sixty-fourth Congress be adopted as the rules of the Senate, with
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on, however, for the Senate agreed almost unanimously to adopt
a two-thirds cloture rule.4" Having obtained the rule he desired,
Senator Walsh withdrew his resolution. In 1953"T and 19578 the
issue was again raised, but a vote was avoided on both occasions.
Whatever meaningful acceptance there has been of the theory
occurred in 1959 when the Senate adopted the provision that the
rules shall continue automatically to the succeeding Senate. 40
Even this "acquiescence" can scarcely be taken as evidence of the
validity of the theory, however, because the critics of unlimited
debate were more concerned in 1959 with obtaining an improved
cloture rule than with opposing the inclusion of a rule that they
contended would have no binding effect on future Senates in any
event.6 °
Indeed, it may be persuasively argued that the continuing
body theory has not been accepted by the Senate at all, for that
body indicates indirectly in many ways that it is not truly continuing. With reference to the introduction of bills, "1 election of
officers,5" election of committee members, 53 consideration of trea-

ties, 54 and submission and consideration of nominations,"5 the
the exception of Rule XXII thereof.
55 CONG. RFC. 9 (1917).
46. 55 CONG. REC. 19-45 (1917) (76 to 3 vote). The cloture rule adopted
was introduced by Senator Martin. 55 CONG. REC. 19 (1917).
47. 99 CONG. REc. 108-284 (1953).
48. 103 CONG. REC. 12-214 (1957).
49. 1963 Senate Manual Rule XXXII(2). While the Senate did operate
under continuing rules from 1789 to 1917 without protest, that "acceptance"
of the continuing body theory seems to have been uncritical. Not until 1917
did the Senate undertake to consider that theory on its merits. Of. 99 CoNo.
REc. 188-89 (1953) (brief placed in the Record by Senator Lehman). See also
note 4 supra.
50. See 105 CONG. REc. 490 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse).
51. 1963 Senate Manual Rule XXXII; see 103 CONG. Rnc. 27 n.8 (1957);
99 CONG. REc. 183 (1953).
52. The old officers carry over until new ones are elected, for the sake of
convenience. The same situation exists in the House of Representatives, which
does not operate under continuing rules. See 103 CONG. REC. 28-29 (1957)
(brief submitted by Senator Douglas).
53. 1963 Senate Manual Rule XXV. The old members retain their seats
until new members are elected. See 99 CONG. RFu. 184 (1953).
54.
[A]U proceedings on treaties shall terminate with the Congress, and
they shall be resumed at the commencement of the next Congress as
if no proceedings had previously been had thereon.
1963 Senate Manual Rule XXXVII(2).
55.
Nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at
which they are made shall not be acted upon at any succeeding session

NOTE
operations of the Senate start afresh with each new Congress.
Further, the Senate has twice determined that it was not bound
by procedural resolutions of previous legislatures. In 1841 the
Senate voted to dismiss the Senate printer appointed by the previous Senate in accordance with a joint resolution authorizing
each house of Congress to choose the printer for the next succeeding house.5 0 In voting to dismiss, the Senate presumably was
unimpressed by the continuing body argument advanced by
Senators Allen and Buchanan. 7 Again, in 1876 the Senate seemingly rejected the continuing body theory when it decided that
the joint rules of the House and Senate, adopted by the first Congress, were not binding upon the then-present Senate, unless that
body adopted them anew. 8 In light of past and present Senate
practices, therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the Senate has
acquiesced in the continuing body proposition; in every respect,
in fact, except with reference to its rules, it appears to have considered itself a noncontinuous body.
The most fundamental objection to the statement that the
Senate is a continuing body, however, is that it is meaningless.
It is merely another way of expressing the fact that two-thirds
of the Senators carry over; it has no other significance:
The argument for the carryover of the rules seems to come down to
this: Because two-thirds of the Senators carry over, the Senate is a
continuous body; because the Senate is a continuous body, the rules
carry over. Striking the words "continuous body" out of this formula,

the argument comes down to this: Since two-thirds of the Senators
carry over, the rules carry over. But this is a patent nonsequitur. It
assumes that the carryover ... always carries over a majority in favor
of the rules.59

The objection to the formula is even more fundamental. Even
assuming that a majority of the surviving Senators favor the
rules, there is still no logical relation between the two statements
in the formula; the fact,that two-thirds of the membership carries
over furnishes no basis for concluding anything about the rules.00
without being again made to the Senate by the President ....
1963 Senate ManualRule XXXVlfl(6).
56. CoNG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 236-40 (1841); see 103 CoNG. REc.
26 (1957) (brief prepared by Senator Douglas); 99 CoNG. Rtc. 187 (1953)
(brief placed in the Record by Senator Lehman); Buiu -, op. cit. Sul=
note 4, at 21-22.
57. CoNG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 9.d Sess. 240 (1841).
58. 4 CONG. Rac. 517-20 (1876); see 99 CoNG. R1c. 187 (1953) (brief

placed in the Record by Senator Lehman).
59. 103 CoNG. Rwc. 29 (1957) (brief prepared by Senator Douglas).
60. See 105 CONG. Rrc. 138-39 (1959).
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Thus, the rationale offered in support of the continuing rules
theory is vulnerable on every ground. Clearly, the Constitution
cannot be said to require its acceptance, nor is there any evidence
that continuing rules are essential for the attainment of the constitutional objective of continuity in policy and responsibility.
Court decisions offer no meaningful support because none has
considered the question on the merits. The acquiescence theory
is not supported by Senate history, nor, if it were, would the
theory be compelling - acquiescence presupposes the right of
nonacquiescence.
B.

LIITATIONS ON THE "CONTINUING RuLES"

THEORY

Assuming, however, that the Constitution requires or tradition permits the Senate to treat itself as continuing with reference to its rules, the question arises as to what, if any, limitations
may be placed on the ability of a succeeding body to change
those rules. That one legislative body cannot bind its successor
irrevocably to its enactments is well settled." Probably none
would disagree that the doctrine is as applicable for legislative
rules as for substantive laws. Critics of the present cloture rule
contend that this doctrine is violated by the present rules0 2 _
because the rules can only be changed under procedures prescribed in the existing rules and because a two-thirds vote is
required in order to end a filibuster on a motion to change the
rules, it is practically impossible to change the cloture rule. Yet
this argument misses the real issue, for the present rule has not
made the Senate rules irrevocable; Rule XXII has only made it
difficult to change the rules - "to admit that difficulty exists in
changing the rules . . .is to admit that the rules are revocable."0'
Thus, the precise issue is not whether a legislative body can pass
irrepealable laws, but what limitations, if any, one legislature may
place on the ability of its successor to change those enactments.
For example, may one legislature stipulate that one or more of
its enactments may be repealed or amended only by two-thirds
vote; may that body require that its parliamentary rules shall
continue until unanimously rejected; may one Senate provide
that its successor can limit debate on a motion to adopt new rules
only by two-thirds vote?
61. E.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 393 n.19 (1948); Reichclderfer
v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932); Newton v. Commissioners of Mahoning
County, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879); 55 CONG. REC. 10-11 (1917) (remarks of
Senator Walsh); COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONL LImITATIONS 14G-47 (1890).
62. See authorities cited note 9 supra.

63. 103 CONG. REC. 212 (1957) (brief placed in the Record by Senator
Daniel).

1964]

NOTE

While there is no direct authority in the United States on the
question of legislative linitations," both the Supreme Court and
scholars are apparently of the view that "if a legislature could in
any degree bind its successors, the result would be an erosion of
power which over the years would render later legislatures helpless in the face of the past."0' 5 To prevent such "erosion of power,"
the Court has concluded that "every succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power with respect to them as
its predecessors. The latter have the same power of repeal and
modification which the former had of enactment, neither more
nor less. All occupy, in this respect, a footing of perfect equality.""0
The wisdom of this conclusion becomes obvious when the alternative is considered. If a succeeding body were bound by previous
provisions for changing the rules, a prior legislature might specify
that cloture was inapplicable to motions to change the rules and
that such motions could be adopted only by unanimous consent,
thus, as a practical matter, assuring the permanence of the rule
itself. Such a procedure not only could result in the Senate being
stymied by inefficient rules, but it would also appear to conflict
with the intent of the constitutional framers that the question of
legislation by consensus or by majority vote be left to congressional discretion. Moreover, it seems anomalous to suggest that
the framers chose not to give a constitutional permanence to
either the consensus theory or the majority rule theory but yet
intended that a single legislative body could accomplish that
same result.
Any legislative body, therefore, may properly ignore any provision that attempts to dictate the procedure to be followed in
amending or repealing antecedent legislation or in changing its
own parliamentary rules. In considering changes in its rules, the
body would operate under whatever parliamentary rules it has
provided for itself, or, in 'the absence of such rules, under general
rules of parliamentary procedure. This rationale would allow the
rules to continue insofar as they dictate the proper procedure in
considering legislation; they would be inapplicable, however, to
64. The Parliament of the Union of South Africa has been similarly

troubled by the question of the binding effect of legislative enactments on
subsequent legislatures with reference to its substantive laws. See MARSuz,
P
rUEnTy
SovEEG= Am
= CommoNwEA T 139-0-48 (1957); cf.
Mitchell, Sovereignty of Parliament- Yet Again, 79 LAw Q. Rlav. 19, 208-

15 (1963).
65. 99 CoxG. PtEc. 182 (1953) (brief placed in the Record by Senator

Lehman); see authorities cited note 61 mspra.

66. Newton v. Commissioners of Mahoning County, 100 U.S. 548, 559
(1879).

9208

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:913

the extent that they prescribed, without the consent of the Senate, procedures for changing the rules. Whatever advantages flow
from permanent rules regarding the substantive legislative process
would thus be retained, 67 while the possibility that the body
would find itself restricted by abusive or inefficient rules would
be avoided.
CONCLUSION
During the past half-century, the Senate membership has frequently disagreed on whether it ought to allow, in its deliberations, unlimited debate, two-thirds cloture, three-fifths cloture,
or cloture by majority vote. This Note has not attempted to determine which rule is preferable; rather the objective has been
to resolve two issues which have frequently troubled the Senate
in choosing between the alternatives: whether the Constitution
compels the Senate to operate under rules that insure consensus
or under the principle of majority vote - if it does compel either
alternative, then, short of constitutional amendment, the question of the wiser alternative is irrelevant; and whether, if the
Constitution does not dictate the choice, a Senate may specify
the procedure by which a succeeding body shall make the choice.
An analysis of events surrounding the constitutional convention and of the constitutional provisions concerning the Senate
leads to the conclusion that the Constitution clearly does not
require consensus and probably does not demand that the Senate
operate only under the principle of majority vote - the decision
is a matter of legislative choice. As to the latter issue, prescriptions by previous Senates of procedures for changing the rules
cannot be persuasively defended by reference to the "continuing
body" theory. At the least, it seems clear that constitutional
theory demands that the continuing rules be considered void
insofar as they limit or control the ability of a succeeding body
to change the rules.
67. If, for example, on the commencement of a new Senate there was no
dissatisfaction with the rules, the Senate could affirmatively, or by acquiescence, acknowledge that the old rules were binding even as to attempts to
change the rules. If, on the other hand, a majority of members were dissatisfled with any rule, they could provide that the old rules would be inapplicable
to any motion to change the rules during that Congress. This would avoid the
dilemma previously facing critics of the rules: if they attacked the "continuing rules" at the commencement of the session, important legislation might
be delayed; if the attack on the rules were delayed until the legislation had
been considered they might have "acquiesced" in the existing rules. See generally 99 CONG. REc. 180-81 (1953) (brief submitted by Senator Lehman).

